<p>The Sept. 30 deadline for Iraq’s militias to surrender their weapons is approaching, and the Iraqi government is looking beyond it. The issue is not the date itself, but whether the Iraqi government has the authority to disarm organizations that have embedded themselves in the country’s political, security, and economic systems.</p>
<p>At the center of this issue is the muqawama, the network of Iran-aligned armed factions that have accumulated military and political power in Iraq.</p>
<p>Recent meetings in New York highlighted Baghdad’s dilemma. An Iraqi delegation attended the United Nations General Assembly, where Iraq’s prime minister met with President Donald Trump, accompanied only by his interpreter. This contrast illustrated the dynamics of the relationship between Washington and Baghdad.</p>
<p>The Iraqi prime minister can discuss issues such as sovereignty and militias with the American president, but he must return to Baghdad to implement any agreements made. The challenge lies in the fragmented political system in Iraq, where power is divided among various entities, including the prime minister’s office, ministries, political parties, and armed factions.</p>
<p>No Iraqi prime minister can simply issue an order for the most powerful armed factions to surrender their weapons, as these factions have established political organizations and economic interests within the Iraqi state.</p>
<p>If the Sept. 30 deadline passes without significant disarmament, it will highlight a longstanding issue: Iraq’s militia problem cannot be resolved merely by setting a timetable and expecting Baghdad to enforce it. Even if the prime minister desires to place all weapons under state authority, the ability to do so is another matter.</p>
<p>Trust is also a critical factor. Washington is engaging with a government that operates within a political system where various parties maintain differing relationships with Tehran. This does not imply that every Iraqi official is aligned with Iran, nor does it suggest that Iraq is an Iranian possession. Many Iraqis seek a sovereign nation capable of independent decision-making.</p>
<p>The fragmentation of power in Iraq is significant. Commitments made by the prime minister in New York cannot be executed unilaterally upon his return to Baghdad. The militia issue is closely tied to Iran, as Tehran maintains political, financial, and organizational connections with key elements of the muqawama. Surrendering their weapons would mean relinquishing a major source of their influence.</p>
<p>For years, Washington has focused on the weapons themselves, but these are only the visible part of a larger problem. Political protection, government positions, economic networks, and Iranian support are all crucial factors. Ultimately, a sovereign government must determine who is authorized to carry weapons within its territory and enforce its laws.</p>
<p>Without this authority, sovereignty becomes merely a concept. The Sept. 30 deadline was intended to demonstrate that Iraq could bring weapons under state control. If the deadline passes without the muqawama disarming, Washington should recognize that another deadline will not resolve the issue.</p>
<p>The central question is not just when Iraq’s militias will surrender their weapons, but whether Baghdad has the authority to compel them to do so. If Baghdad cannot disarm the muqawama, the deadline will reveal that Tehran still holds significant influence over Iraq’s most powerful armed factions.</p>
<p><em>Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, Middle East security, Iraqi politics, and regional affairs.</em></p>