The 2022 peace deal ended the war but left key disputes unresolved, giving the TPLF room to regroup as tensions return.
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – When Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, it was intended to end two years of conflict. The agreement mandated a permanent cessation of hostilities, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Tigrayan forces, political dialogue, and the return of displaced individuals. Article 7 required the TPLF to refrain from conscription, training, deployment, and mobilisation of military forces, as well as preparations for renewed conflict.
Nearly four years later, while large-scale war has ceased, many disputes that fueled it remain unresolved. Since 2024, the TPLF has repositioned itself politically and organisationally while maintaining military leverage and forming new relationships. Notable developments include TPLF contacts with Eritrean officials, reported meetings in Dubai and Zalambessa, a renewed struggle for political control in Tigray, reports of recruitment and mobilisation, new clashes involving Tigrayan forces, and the emergence of Tsimdo, a coalition of groups opposed to the federal government.
These developments raise questions about whether the Pretoria Agreement facilitated a transition to peace or allowed the TPLF to regroup while underlying conflicts persisted. There is no evidence that the TPLF entered the agreement with a plan to use it as a tactical pause, but events since 2024 suggest that the movement has retained an organisational and security role that the agreement aimed to diminish.
Article 6 established the process for disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating TPLF fighters. Following the agreement, Tigrayan forces handed over heavy weapons, and thousands of former combatants entered demobilisation programmes. However, the process did not fully dismantle the region’s military structures.
In 2026, reports emerged of renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray. If confirmed, this would challenge Article 7’s ban on conscription and mobilisation. The distinction between organised mobilisation and the views of Tigray’s civilian population is significant, as there is no basis for assuming that Tigrayans as a whole support a return to war. A civilian source in Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, stated: “The people of Tigray want peace; we don’t want a second war.”
For civilians, reports of recruitment imply the possibility of being drawn back into a conflict they believed had ended. From 2024, the TPLF faced an internal struggle over its direction post-war, with internal meetings and political manoeuvring reflecting a wider contest over the movement’s future.
Getachew Reda was removed as head of the interim administration in 2025 and replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede. In May 2026, the Tigray regional council was reinstated, electing Debretsion Gebremichael as president, which strengthened the position of his faction.
These developments indicate that the TPLF remains a powerful political force in Tigray. Instead of a settled post-war political order, the region is again embroiled in a struggle for authority while the security situation remains unresolved.
By early 2026, political tensions coincided with military developments. Tigray Defence Forces-aligned troops crossed the Tekeze River into the disputed Tselemt district in January, clashing with Ethiopian federal forces. Later, TDF-aligned fighters took control of Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew. By August, fighting resumed in western Tigray near the Sudanese border, marking another serious breach of the peace agreement.
The federal government and the TPLF blamed each other for the escalation, with responsibility for initiating the clashes remaining disputed. However, the renewed fighting demonstrated that organised armed forces could still mobilise and contest territory.
The incomplete disarmament has become more consequential as the political disputes left unresolved by Pretoria have begun to coincide with renewed military activity. The repositioning has extended beyond Tigray. Eritrea and the TPLF fought a border war from 1998 to 2000, and Eritrean forces later fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal government against the TPLF during the 2020-22 Tigray war. However, the post-Pretoria period has seen reports of closer contacts between Eritrea and elements of the TPLF, with Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and using it as a proxy, a characterization Eritrea rejects.
A broader realignment is reflected in the emergence of Tsimdo, a coalition of groups opposed to the federal government. Recent reports have identified cooperation involving the TPLF, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and other armed groups. Fano leader Zemene Kassie confirmed the existence of such a coalition, stating that Eritrea is not currently part of it.
The significance of Tsimdo lies not only in whether its members share the same political programme but in their willingness to set aside differences to cooperate. Major disputes remain unresolved: displaced individuals have yet to return to contested areas, including Welkait, while territorial claims continue to divide Tigray and Amhara actors. However, groups that once fought on opposing sides now appear willing to cooperate to increase pressure on the federal government.
This raises questions about the TPLF’s post-Pretoria strategy. The organisation seems to be rebuilding its political influence while retaining military links, even as many Tigrayans remain displaced and fear renewed mobilisation. The emerging convergence indicates a widening gap between the strategic calculations of political and armed actors and the immediate interests of civilians still dealing with the consequences of war.
These groups have different histories and political ambitions, and their cooperation may not last. However, their willingness to find common ground against Addis Ababa is significant. For the TPLF, Tsimdo offers another arena to build political and strategic relationships beyond Tigray.
The war displaced approximately 1.9 million people, many of whom remain unable to return, particularly to disputed areas. Territorial disputes remain closely tied to the return of displaced Tigrayans, while the political relationship between Tigray and the federal government remains unsettled. The federal government has also failed to deliver on key elements of the post-war settlement. However, those failures do not erase the TPLF’s commitments under Pretoria. Article 6 envisioned the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of its fighters, while Article 7 banned conscription, mobilisation, and preparations for renewed conflict.
The record since 2024 does not prove that Pretoria was deliberately used by the TPLF to buy time. It does, however, show a movement that has remained politically organised, fought to regain control of Tigray’s institutions, retained links to armed structures, and found new potential partners as the settlement stalled. Pretoria ended the large-scale war but did not resolve the underlying struggles over power, territory, and security.
For Tigrayans, the calculations are simpler. A young man from Tigray, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, stated: “The fear of being drafted is what’s making many youth lose hope.”