Morocco’s parliamentary election campaign began on September 10, with 27 political parties competing for 395 seats in the House of Representatives. More than 15.8 million voters are registered for the September 23 vote, which will determine Parliament’s composition and play a central role in forming the next government.
The election raises questions about citizens' trust in the political system's ability to address daily life issues, particularly for younger Moroccans. An Afrobarometer survey published in March found that about one-third of Moroccans aged 18 to 35 expressed trust in Parliament, the head of government, and political parties. However, young people were more likely than older Moroccans to engage politically on social media and participate in demonstrations.
Morocco’s electoral politics operate within a constitutional framework established in 2011, defining the country as a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary, and social monarchy. The king appoints the head of government from the political party that wins the most seats in the House of Representatives and presides over the Council of Ministers, while the government exercises executive power and Parliament handles legislative and oversight functions.
The age profile of the electorate shows that voters aged 18 to 24 account for 4 percent of those registered, while individuals aged 60 and above make up 29 percent. This demographic distribution indicates a significant weighting towards older citizens in the registered electorate.
Morocco faces a substantial youth employment problem, with the IMF estimating an unemployment rate of 13 percent in 2025, and 37.3 percent among 15-to-24-year-olds. Additionally, 25.2 percent of young people were not in employment, education, or training in the third quarter of 2025. The IMF also highlights issues such as skills mismatches, limited private-sector growth, and gender disparities in labor-market participation.
For young people struggling to enter the labor market, promises about growth, jobs, and purchasing power are critical measures of the political system's effectiveness.
In late July, approximately 60,000 people entered the autonomous Spanish city of Ceuta from Morocco, the largest surge in recent history, linked to economic hardship and social unrest. This incident illustrates how economic expectations and migration aspirations can intersect.
The economic debate surrounding the election focuses on whether Morocco’s recent growth and development projects are creating visible opportunities for younger citizens. The IMF estimates that real GDP grew by 4.9 percent in 2025 and projects growth of 4.4 percent in 2026, yet high unemployment remains a challenge.
Employment and purchasing power are central themes in the programs of the three parties forming the governing coalition since 2021: the National Rally of Independents (RNI), the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), and Istiqlal. The RNI’s 2026–2031 program promises one million jobs and a gradual increase in the minimum wage to 5,000 dirhams (about $530) per month. PAM has pledged at least one million jobs, with a five-year program costing 350 billion dirhams ($37.1 billion). Istiqlal emphasizes purchasing power and public services, alongside proposals on healthcare, housing, employment, water management, and food security.
The Justice and Development Party (PJD), led by former head of government Abdelilah Benkirane, seeks to regain support after significant losses in 2021, where it fell from 125 seats to 13. The PJD's program focuses on institutional, economic, social, and foreign policy reforms.
The upcoming election will test whether Morocco’s political system can maintain a credible connection between its development agenda and the expectations of citizens, particularly younger Moroccans who exhibit low trust in political institutions amid high unemployment. Economic researcher Nouh El Harmouzi notes that Morocco’s economic problems are structural and cannot be resolved through short-term electoral promises.